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Forward looking measures like the well-known effective marginal tax rate developed by King 
and Fullerton (1984) are often criticized for not taking into account the complexity of the tax 
law. This paper derives a method of evaluating this kind of measure and of quantifying the 
bias resulting from simplifying assumptions, especially on the pattern of depreciation 
deductions. We apply our method to German data and find that even small estimation biases 
in determining the tax deductions have a large impact on the effective tax rates for marginal 
and inframarginal investment projects. We conclude that our method may be used to quantify 
exactly the difference between the actual use of depreciation deductions and the King-
Fullerton assumptions and therefore to correct the conventional forward looking measures. 
JEL Code: H21, H25. 
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In recent years, many countries have implemented tax reforms designed tostimulate investment
and growth. Given this objective, it is important to assess the impact of these reforms on
the e¤ective tax burden on investment. Measuring the tax burden on investment, however,
is a di¢cult task. In the literature, the dominating concept is the e¤ective marginal tax
rate measure introduced by King & Fullerton (1984). The KF e¤ective marginal tax rate is
a forward looking concept. On the basis of statutory tax rates and tax bases, KF (1984)
consider a permanent increase in the capital stock of a representative …rm and calculate the
tax burden on the basis of the di¤erence between the rate of return of the marginal investment
and the return required by the investor. The KF approach allows to calculate the marginal
tax burden on investment in di¤erent types of assets and under di¤erent assumptions on the
source of …nancing. As every forward looking concept, the KF approach has the disadvantage
that it does not use the actual behaviour of economic agents in order to assess the tax burden
on investment.1
Recently, Gordon, Kalambokidis & Slemrod (2003) have suggested a new measure of the
marginal tax burden on investment. The di¤erence to KF (1984) is that this new measure is a
backward looking concept. Under certain assumptions it can be shown that the depreciation
deductions in one period can be used to approximate the future deductions of the investment
project under consideration. However, due to its strict assumptions this new measure has
several shortcomings when applied to real world data.
The purpose of the analysis in this paper is twofold. Firstly, we reconsider and re…ne
the main idea of the GKS approach and we explore the consequences of relaxing some of the
assumptions made in GKS (2003). On the basis of this idea, we develop a method of evaluating
the KF-style measures and correcting them for errors due to tax law complexities. The second
purpose of this paper is to apply our method to German balance sheet data. The results of
our empirical analysis suggest that forward looking measures slightly overestimate the average
e¤ective marginal tax burden on investment. The reason is that the assumed tax depreciation
rules are more restrictive than the tax depreciation actually observed in the data. Moreover,
the accuracy of forward looking indicators varies considerably across …rms. We investigate the
factors explaining the di¤erences across …rms and …nd that tax depreciation is unexpectedly
high in …rms with a low share of …xed assets and low levels of debt …nancing.
Apart from serving as an empirical check on the accuracy of forward looking indicators
of the e¤ective tax burden, our methodology and our empirical results may also be seen as a
…rst step towards reconciling the results of studies based on forward looking measures of the
e¤ective tax burden with those based on backward looking measures, who usually …nd lower
1Devereux & Gri¢th (1998) develop a variant of the KF approach that allows to compute e¤ective marginal
and average tax rates in a common theoretical framework. Another well known forward looking concept is the
European Tax Analyzer developed by Jacobs & Spengel (1996). Their approach is based on a model …rm and
allows to derive e¤ective average tax rates.
1e¤ective tax rates.
The setup of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we consider a standard model of
investment and describe the theoretical basis of the empirical approach we use. In section 3,
we apply our method to German data and compute the adjusted e¤ective tax rates. Section
4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The capital cost approach
We consider a standard model of an in…nitely lived …rm. At the beginning of period t, the
…rm invests It in non-…nancial assets. The …rm’s capital stock in period t is Kt, where
Kt = (1 ¡ –)Kt¡1 + It (1)
is the capital stock resulting from investment in the current and earlier periods. It is the
amount of gross investment in period t and – is the rate of economic depreciation. Investment
is either …nanced by debt or retained earnings. The share of debt …nancing is denoted by b.
Following King & Fullerton (1984), we assume that the …rm considers a permanent increase
in the capital stock. This implies that an investment It in period t triggers an additional
replacement investment of –It in each subsequent period. Given this, the …rm’s market value
Vt of the project under consideration can be written as
V
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(1 + i)s +
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s=1
(1 + …)s[Ft+s(Kt) ¡ Ft+s(Kt ¡ It) ¡ –It]
(1 + i)s (2)
where i is the nominal interest rate and … is the rate of in‡ation. Henceforth, the "*" stands
for the absence of taxes. We assume that in‡ation in output prices equals in‡ation in prices
for investment goods. With ft =
Ft(Kt)¡Ft(Kt¡It)
It the output surplus per unit of investment











(ft+s ¡ –) (3)
With ft+s = f, for every s, the project value becomes:
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What is the impact of introducing taxes? We focus on taxes at the …rm level and abstract
from personal taxes. In the presence of taxes, the present value of the …rm’s cash ‡ow related
to the project becomes




























where u is the corporate tax rate and ds is the rate of depreciation for s year old investment
goods. Note that future replacement investment is assumed to be fully …nanced through equity
and depreciated as any other kind of non-…nancial investment.
For the marginal investment, the project value (denoted as vm
t ) equals zero.
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t+s = 0 (6)
As above, assume that fm
t+s = fm, for every s, and it follows:
f




















The right hand of (7) represents the cost of capital for the marginal investment. The
…rst term is equal to the cost of capital in the absence of taxes and the second term is the







full equity …nancing (or no deductibility of interest on debt), the tax wedge on the marginal

























(i ¡ … + (1 + …)–)
(9)
The next step will be to develop methods how to compute the EMTRs.
32.2 The King-Fullerton-approach
Following the standard approach by King and Fullerton (1984) equation (8) can be computed


















where the es denote the legal provisions for depreciation deductions. This forward-looking
method has often been criticized for not taking into account the entire complexity of the tax
law and the variety of special legal provisions that allow …rms to lower their tax burden.
2.3 The GKS idea
This criticism is referred to in recent work by Gordon, Kalambokidis and Slemrod (2003),





(1+i)s on the basis of historical data. Denote as Dt the tax de-






where dm denotes the tax depreciation for m year old capital2. Dividing by It and assuming







(1 + !)m (12)
GKS (2003b) assume that the tax law remains stable, that the investment growth rate
! equals the nominal interest rate i and that the asset structure is constant. Under these
assumptions, the ratio Dt





new investment. Thus, the ratio Dt
It observed in the data can serve as an empirical approxim-













If the tax law remains stable over time and if the assumption i = ! is satis…ed, EMTRGKS
can be compared directly to EMTRKF in order to check whether the assumptions made
on depreciation allowances em are empircally correct.3 Unfortunately, the tax law changes
2The time vector s denotes the future, m the past.
3If there are di¤erences between EMTRGKS and EMTRKF, these can only be due to di¤erences in the
4frequently and there is no reason why the investment growth rate should be equal to the
nominal interest rate. In fact, in our data set, the investment growth rate is much lower than
the interest rate. A lognormal regression over the period under consideration (1993-2002)
yields a growth rate of ! = 1;44% whereas the average bond yield is i = 6;7%. We therefore
have to relax the assumptions made in GKS.
2.4 Relaxing some GKS assumptions
2.4.1 Di¤erent investment growth
If i 6= ! the analysis becomes somewhat more complicated, since Dt=It as an estimator for
future depreciation deductions is now biased depending on the di¤erence between i and !.4
We may solve this problem as follows. The "true" depreciation allowances dm of equation (12)
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(1+!)m in order to compute the impact of "special"
deductions. The problem is that our real interest is the present value of special depreciation
allowances for future investment, which is discounted at rate i which diverges signi…cantly
from !. We therefore have to assume that special depreciation allowances are a constant















(1 + !)m (16)
The parameter • can be interpreted as a measure of how much observed depreciation
allowances deviate from allowances assumed in forward looking e¤ective tax rate measures. •
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(1+!)m is the modi…ed King-Fullerton deductions term, where the discount factor i
depreciation allowances em and dm. This can be seen by considering the di¤erence in the tax wedge (TW) as
calculated under the KF approach and the GKS approach. Under the assumption i = !, this di¤erence is
given by















4If i > !, Dt=It overestimates depreciation allowances (and thus underestimates the e¤ective marginal tax
rate) and vice versa.
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In order to calculate this adjusted e¤ective marginal tax rate, two additional complications
have to be taken into account: The …rst is that the tax law may change and the second is that
the tax law treats di¤erent types of assets di¤erently.
2.4.2 Changing tax law
The tax law, especially the provisions for depreciation deductions, is changed quite frequently.
This has to be taken into account in our approach. For instance, if the present tax system
contains more generous deductions than before, the estimator ^ • in equation (17) would be
biased downwards. We therefore have to correct for tax policy changes, which can be done by












(1+!)s is a correction term which is computable on the basis of the tax
law. The hm correspond to the depreciation rules which were valid in the period when the
investment was realized.
2.4.3 Investment structure
So far, we have analyzed the problem for a single type of asset. In reality the capital stock is
composed of di¤erent asset types, each of which is treated di¤erently in the tax law and has







where K is the number of assets and Mk is the number of periods in which the asset




m=1hm;kIt¡m;k can be understood as a virtual time path of
depreciation deductions.
63 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we apply our method to German data. The basic idea of our approach may
be summarized as follows. For the investment observed in the data5, we calculate the path
of tax depreciations which would arise if the depreciation rules assumed by forward looking
measures of the e¤ective tax burden were applied. We then compare this hypothetical path
of depreciation to the tax depreciation observed in the data. The di¤erence between the two
is summarized in the parameter •. We will then use our results on • to assess the current
e¤ective tax burden on investment in Germany.
3.1 The data
We use data from the DAFNE database which includes balance sheet data of 22.000 German
…rms from di¤erent industrial and commercial branches covering the period from 1993 to 2002.
In order to estimate •we need data covering at least eight years without interruption, which
corresponds to the depreciation duration of machines6. We have to exclude all …rms which do
not satisfy this condition. After all, 1495 …rms remain in our dataset.
Table 1 provides a descriptive statistic of the data sample. The capital stock is measured
in thousand Euro. For immaterials, tangible assets and inventories the fractions of the capital
stock are given. The di¤erence to 1 is the fraction of …nancial assets. The average …rm has a
leverage (= debt through total capital) of 45,5%.
mean stand. dev. median
capital stock 495.956 3.755.774 93.700
immaterials 0,067 0,563 0,005
tangible assets 0,413 0,303 0,363
of which structures 0,375 0,370 0,234
of which machines 0,625 0,370 0,766
inventories 0,107 0,150 0,036
debt ratio 0,455 0,239 0,446
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
As explained in section 2, we have to take into account that the tax law has changed in
2001. Table 2 presents the di¤erence between the former and the new deduction system.
5Since the capital stock in the balance sheet is only decreased by depreciation deductions, It can be
constructed by:
It = Kt ¡ Kt¡1 + Dt
The Kt and the Dt can be drawn from the balance sheet data.
6That means, that Mk is not higher than 7 for any of the asset types except for structures and buildings.
Here, we assume that the whole stock of structures and buildings can be depreciated, i.e. that all buildings
have been built in the last 25 years. We therefore might overstate the true depreciation deductions.
7Asset type ...-2000 (hk) 2001-... (ek)
type years type years
Immaterials linear (20%) 5 linear (20%) 5
Machines degr. (30%) 4 degr. (20%) 2
linear (8%) 3 linear (12,8%) 5
Structures linear (4%) 25 linear (3%) 33
Inventories - - - -
Table 2: Deduction rules
3.2 Results
3.2.1 The estimation of •
As pointed out in the theoretical section, we estimate the share of special deductions • by
constructing a virtual time path of tax deductions. With 1495 …rms in our dataset we compute
3157 estimates of • for the years 2000-2002 using equation (20), 1498 estimates for the year





Table 3: estimation results
On average, the observed tax deductions of …rms exceed those assumed by forward looking
KF style measures by 30%. However, the high standard deviation and the smaller median
suggest that we should take a closer look at the distribution of •.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of • in decile classes. Due to its construction, • can take
values between ¡1 and +1. The last column at the right side shows the number of • with a
value greater than 2;9. At …rst glance, • seems to have a normally shaped distribution around
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Figure 1: distribution of •
Typically, arithmetic means of skewed distributions react strongly to the exclusion of ex-
treme values. Figure 2 shows how the mean develops as a function of the number of extreme
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Figure 2: mean and number of excluded values
The average • takes values between 0,294 and 0,069, depending on the number of excluded
values. In economic terms, the average …rms depreciates between 7% and 30% more than
suggested by the forward-looking measures. On the basis of these estimates, we are now able
to compute an adjusted EMTR.
3.2.2 The adjusted EMTR
In the following, the EMTR is computed with and without taking into account the correc-
tion parameter •. For simplicity, we consider an investment project with an asset structure
9corresponding to the average asset structure in the sample (without inventories and …nancial
assets)7, which is presented in Table 4.
Asset type Immaterials Structures Machines
Share 14;0% 32;3% 53;7%
Table 4: Asset structure
The statutory tax rate u has been calculated by Spengel (2001) on the basis of statutory
rates of the German corporate income tax ("Körperschaftsteuer") and the local business tax
("Gewerbeertragsteuer"). We adopt this value and set u = 39;4%.
The assumptions on the economic depreciation – correspond to average depreciation rates
used by the German Council of Economic Advisers (Sachverständigenrat (2001))8. Given the
structure of our hypothetical investment project, the total rate of economic depreciation is
– = 6;6%. The values for the nominal interest rate (i = 7%) and the in‡ation rate (… = 2%)
are adopted as well.
Obviously, the share of debt …nancing b at the margin may di¤er from average debt …n-
ancing. We therefore consider three di¤erent values of b: pure equity …nance (b = 0), pure
debt …nance (b = 1) and mixed …nance (b = 44;4%), which corresponds to the average debt
…nancing share of the whole capital stock in our data set.
Table 5 shows the e¤ective marginal tax rate according to the conventional method (• = 0)
and with di¤erent • ranging between the median (• = 6;9%) and the arithmetic mean (29;6%).
EMTR (%) adjusted EMTR (%)
b(%) • = 0% • = 6;9% • = 10% • = 20% • = 29;6%
0 34;2 31;0 29;5 24;1 18;1
44;4 18;7 13;9 11;5 2;8 ¡7;3
100 ¡15;1 ¡25;1 ¡30;2 ¡49;8 ¡75;2
Table 5: EMTR with and without kappa
It becomes clear, that even with a relatively small • of about 7% the e¤ective marginal
tax rate is considerably biased downwards. With a rising • the bias incrases quickly.
3.3 Explanation of di¤erences in • across …rms
As shown in the preceding section, the distribution of • has a large variance. There seem
to be …rms which deduct much more than the KF style measures assume and others which
apparently "play the rules". This raises the question of what determines the di¤erent levels
of •. Theoretically, there are several factors which might have an impact on depreciation
7Note that our results do not depend on the speci…c asset structure of the investment project. However, to
illustrate our results we have to assume some structure.
8The calculations of the Council of Economic advisers are based on Spengel (2001), where the assumptions
on economic depreciation and tax depreciation rates can be found.
10behaviour. Firstly, there might be sector speci…c di¤erences in • because of sector speci…c
depreciation allowances which are not captured by KF assumptions. Secondly, it is likely that
…rms will try less hard to use special depreciation allowances if they have other tax shields,
such as a high level of debt or losses which are carried forward. Finally, it may be that
depreciation behaviour depends on the structure of assets or the organizational form. In order
to investigate these issues, we have run regressions where we use • as the dependent variable
and try to explain its value as a function of (1) the sector, (2) the organizational form and (3)
the structure of the balance sheet.
3.3.1 • and di¤erent sectors
Our data sample contains data points from …rms in the following industrial and commercial
sectors: agriculture (12 …rms), mining (21), manufacturing (825), energy (620), construction
(83), commerce (290), restaurants (5), transport (227), banking (24), real estate (813), public
administration (8), education (6), health (80) and other public services (87).
Does the value of • depend on the sector for which could exist special depreciation op-
portunities? Table 6 shows the regression results for • with two time dummies and di¤erent
branches as independent variables. As in every following regression result the time dummy for
2002 has a signi…cant positive coe¢cient. This should not be overinterpreted, though, since
the number of observations di¤er in each year. There are two sectors which exhibit highly
signi…cant regression values: agriculture and the banking sector.
Dependent Variable: KAPPA 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1 3157 
Included observations: 3157 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.  
CONST  -0.022931  0.244355  -0.093845  0.9252 
2001  -0.066345  0.075472  -0.879065  0.3794 
2002  0.181596  0.085052  2.135110  0.0328 
AGRICULTURE  2.096612  0.582236  3.600970  0.0003 
MINING  0.173985  0.467988  0.371772  0.7101 
MANUFACTURE  0.416398  0.253623  1.641798  0.1007 
ENERGY  0.291185  0.256542  1.135039  0.2564 
CONSTRUCTION  0.269710  0.317023  0.850759  0.3950 
COMMERCE  0.333086  0.267844  1.243584  0.2137 
RESTAURANTS  0.069376  0.852675  0.081363  0.9352 
TRANSPORT  0.312924  0.273996  1.142072  0.2535 
BANKING  2.214154  0.446086  4.963517  0.0000 
REALESTATE  0.148961  0.253699  0.587155  0.5571 
PUBLICADMIN  -0.253140  0.691211  -0.366227  0.7142 
EDUCATION  -0.144642  0.784800  -0.184304  0.8538 
HEALTH  0.059213  0.319091  0.185568  0.8528 
PUBLICSERVICE  0.266222  0.313566  0.849014  0.3959 
R-squared  0.018607     Mean dependent var  0.294143 
Adjusted R-squared  0.013606     S.D. dependent var  1.839361 
S.E. of regression  1.826804     Akaike info criterion  4.048384 
Sum squared resid  10478.85     Schwarz criterion  4.081002 
Log likelihood  -6373.374     F-statistic  3.720854 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.448979     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000001 
 
Table 6: • and di¤erent branches
The high regression coe¢cients for these two branch dummies raise the question, if our
11estimated • > 0 can be explained simply by special provisions for agricultural …rms and banks.
In this case the constant should be near to zero if one adds just the variables "AGRICUL-
TURE" and "BANKS". As table 7 shows, this is not the case.
Dependent Variable: KAPPA 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1 3157 
Included observations: 3157 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.  
CONST  0.247763  0.047420  5.224910  0.0000 
2001  -0.056708  0.075070  -0.755406  0.4501 
2002  0.196431  0.084501  2.324612  0.0202 
AGRICULTURE  1.817761  0.528533  3.439258  0.0006 
BANKING  1.938578  0.374438  5.177308  0.0000 
R-squared  0.014633     Mean dependent var  0.294143 
Adjusted R-squared  0.013383     S.D. dependent var  1.839361 
S.E. of regression  1.827011     Akaike info criterion  4.044822 
Sum squared resid  10521.28     Schwarz criterion  4.054416 
Log likelihood  -6379.752     F-statistic  11.70229 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.443698     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
 
Table 7: constant variable, agriculture and banking
3.3.2 • and di¤erent organizational forms
The most frequent organizational forms in our data sample are "GmbH" (1763 …rms), "AG"
(1229) and "GmbH&Co KG" (69). Table 8 shows the regression results with respect to the
three most frequent organizational forms in the data sample.
Dependent Variable: KAPPA 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1 3157 
Included observations: 3157 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.  
CONST  -0.067945  0.190263  -0.357112  0.7210 
2001  -0.077926  0.075507  -1.032047  0.3021 
2002  0.168421  0.085095  1.979214  0.0479 
AG  0.504702  0.194397  2.596251  0.0095 
GMBH  0.262055  0.192200  1.363452  0.1728 
GMBH&COKG  0.328384  0.289427  1.134598  0.2566 
R-squared  0.007711     Mean dependent var  0.294143 
Adjusted R-squared  0.006137     S.D. dependent var  1.839361 
S.E. of regression  1.833708     Akaike info criterion  4.052456 
Sum squared resid  10595.19     Schwarz criterion  4.063969 
Log likelihood  -6390.802     F-statistic  4.897289 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.435799     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000182 
 
Table 8: • and di¤erent organizational forms
The AG-dummy (for "Aktiengesellschaft") is highly signi…cant and suggests that • is bigger
for AGs.
3.3.3 • and the balance sheet structure
Finally we look at general characteristics of the balance structure. Table 9 presents the
regression results with respect to the size of the capital stock (CAP_SIZE), the leverage, the
12ratio of tangible goods relative to the total capital and a dummy for the use of loss carry
forwards9.
Dependent Variable: KAPPA 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1 3157 
Included observations: 3157 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.  
CONST  0.803359  0.085490  9.397163  0.0000 
2001  -0.065468  0.074722  -0.876143  0.3810 
2002  0.194011  0.084138  2.305873  0.0212 
CAP_SIZE  4.24E-09  8.21E-09  0.516537  0.6055 
LEVERAGE  -0.479279  0.142401  -3.365688  0.0008 
TANGIBLE  -0.804076  0.110450  -7.280029  0.0000 
LOSSCARRYFOR  0.150676  0.156839  0.960702  0.3368 
R-squared  0.026275     Mean dependent var  0.294143 
Adjusted R-squared  0.024420     S.D. dependent var  1.839361 
S.E. of regression  1.816763     Akaike info criterion  4.034205 
Sum squared resid  10396.98     Schwarz criterion  4.047636 
Log likelihood  -6360.993     F-statistic  14.16633 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.468853     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
 
Table 9: • and the balance structure
Only the leverage ratio and the tangible goods ratio are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
How can these results be interpreted? First, the size of the capital stock or the use of loss
carry forward provisions seem to have no importance to explain the value of •.
Second, the fact that • decreases when the debt ratio increases seems quite plausible. Since
the cost of debt can be deducted from the tax base, a higher share of debt …nance reduces the
incentive to search for alternative tax shields.
Third, it seems di¢cult to explain, why a higher share of tangible assets reduces the use
of special deductions. It is possible that immaterial capital goods can be faster depreciated
than suggested in the KF assumptions. There may also be opportunities to depreciate losses
related to …nancial assets which are not captured by standard KF assumptions.
3.3.4 Multicollinearity?
Our method to measure separately the impact of di¤erent factors raises the question of multi-
collinearity. Especially the clear results for the organizational forms and the balance structure
might be linked somehow10. And, indeed, running regressions with the organizational form as
dependent variable and the structural variables shows that these factors are not independent
from each other.
The question remains which of the two types of variables is the one which drives the other.
If we put the two types in one regression it turns out that the structural variables keep being
highly signi…cant whereas the organizational forms are not, as can be seen in table 10.
9Before using a quantitative variable we tested the dummy. Since it has no signi…cant impact we abandoned
the search in this direction.
10We tested for multicollinearity between the branch dummies and the structural variables, and the branches
and organizational forms as well, but there are only weak linkages.
13Dependent Variable: KAPPA 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1 3157 
Included observations: 3157 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.  
CONST  0.524288  0.207983  2.520826  0.0118 
2001  -0.071080  0.074906  -0.948925  0.3427 
2002  0.184382  0.084456  2.183164  0.0291 
AG  0.309799  0.194481  1.592956  0.1113 
GMBH  0.226494  0.190657  1.187962  0.2349 
GMBH&COKG  0.184650  0.287558  0.642131  0.5208 
CAP_SIZE  3.49E-09  8.24E-09  0.423495  0.6720 
LEVERAGE  -0.436490  0.144975  -3.010797  0.0026 
TANGIBLE  -0.772908  0.113390  -6.816341  0.0000 
LOSSCARRYFOR  0.161390  0.157613  1.023963  0.3059 
R-squared  0.027291     Mean dependent var  0.294143 
Adjusted R-squared  0.024509     S.D. dependent var  1.839361 
S.E. of regression  1.816681     Akaike info criterion  4.035061 
Sum squared resid  10386.13     Schwarz criterion  4.054249 
Log likelihood  -6359.345     F-statistic  9.810332 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.466332     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
 
Table 10: •, organizational form and balance structure
This could be a hint that AGs do not have higher • because of their organizational form
but due to their speci…c balance sheet structure.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a method of correcting conventional forward looking measures
of e¤ective taxation for real world complexities. Thus, our method o¤ers an empirical test for
the validity of assumptions on depreciation deductions used for the construction of forward
looking measures. On the basis of our estimates of the "true" use of depreciation deductions,
we are able to compute "adjusted e¤ective tax rates" for marginal investment decisions.
We have applied our method to the DAFNE dataset of German …rms. It turns out that
depreciation deductions used by the median (average) …rm exceed the depreciation deductions
asumed by KF measures by 7% (30%) . If these estimates are correct, the KF concept
systematically overestimates the e¤ective tax burden on investment. To demonstrate the
bias caused by the misestimation of depreciation deductions we have computed the e¤ective
marginal tax rates with di¤erent assumptions on the use of special deductions. It turns out that
even small errors in the speci…cation of the deductions pattern lead to considerable variations
in the measures of e¤ective taxation.
The regression analysis shows that • rises with an increasing share of equity …nance and
an decreasing share of tangible assets. The banking and the agricultural sectors depreciate
more than other branches.
These results suggest that the approach developed here might be a …rst step towards
reconciling the di¤erent results of studies based on forward and backward looking indicators.
The fact that backward looking indicators, in particular macro indicators, often …nd a lower
14e¤ective tax burden on investment may partly be due to the failure of forward looking concepts
to take into account all possibilities of …rms to use deduction possibilities o¤ered by the tax
law.
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